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SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION
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1.1 EVA RISK: ]'HE ROLE OF SPACE DEBRIS
The risk of EVAs is critical to the decision of whether or not to automate a large part
of the construction of the International Space Station (ISS). Furthermore, the choice of the
technologies of the space suit and the life support system will determine (1) the immediate
safety of these operations, and (2) the long-run costs and risks of human presence in space, not
only in lower orbit (as is the case of the ISS) but also perhaps, outside these orbits, or on the
surface of other planets. The problem is therefore both an immediate one and a long-term one.
The fundamental question is how and when to shin from the existing EMU system (suit,
helmet, gloves and life support system) to another type (eg. a hard suit), given the potential
trade-offs among life-cycle costs, risks to the astronauts, performance of tasks, and
uncertainties about new systems' safety inherent to such a shift in technology. A more
immediate issue is how to manage the risks of EVAs during the construction and operation of
the ISS in order to make the astronauts (in the words of the NASA Administrator) "as safe
outside as inside".
For the moment (June 1997), the plan is to construct the Space Station using the low-
pressure space suits that have been developed for the space shuttle. In the following, we will
refer to this suit assembly as EMU (External Maneuvering Unit). It is the product of a long
evolution, starting from the U.S. Air Force pilot suits through the various versions and changes
that occurred for the purpose of NASA space exploration, in particular during the Gemini and
the Apollo programs. The Shuttle EMU is composed of both soft fabrics and hard plates. As
an alternative to the shuttle suit, at least two hard suits were developed by NASA: the AX5
and the MRKIII. The problem of producing hard suits for space exploration is very similar to
that of producing deep-sea diving suits. There was thus an opportunity to develop a suit that
could be manufactured for both purposes with the economies of scale that could be gained
from a two-branch manufacturing line (space and deep sea). Of course, the space suit would
need to be space qualified. Some of the problems in adopting one of the hard suits were first
that the testing had to be completed, and second that it required additional storage space. The
decision was made not to develop a hard suit in time for the construction and operation of the
ISS. Instead, to improve the safety of the current suit, it was decided to reinforce the soft
parts of the shuttle EMU with KEVLAR linings to strengthen it against debris impacts. Test
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results, however, show that this advanced suit design has little effect on the penetration
characteristics (Cour-Palais, 1996).
The advantage of the existing EMU design is that it is a mature technology. It has the
thmiliar flexibility of fabric and a relatively small mass, it can be stowed in a smaller space and
it does not require major further development costs. The downsides of the current suit are that
the soft parts are more vulnerable to space debris than the hard plates or the hard suits, that the
current (improved) shuttle EMU is very costly to manufacture and maintain, and that its low
pressure may affect the performance of the astronauts. Both the AX5 and MRK III are more
robust but are bulky and have more mass than the current space suit. In the long run, an
alternative solution will probably have to be developed anyway for the work that will be done
in Earth's orbits and for planetary exploration. NASA, however, may face political as well as
economic and technical constraints in that decision.
The problem of EVA safety has changed slightly in recent years because the density of
space debris in low-earth orbit (up to 1,000 km above the Earth's surface) has increased
markedly and is likely to continue to increase. The hard plates of any suit are not invulnerable
to these debris hits if the debris particles are large enough, but the soil fabrics, which at this
time constitute about 2/3 of the total exposed surface of the EMU, are definitely more
vulnerable. Debris 0.4mm in diameter and above can result in fatal accidents, especially
(depending on their shape) if they hit the fabric perpendicularly to the surface.
Debris hits, of course, are not the only source of failure risk in EVAs In a risk analysis
model developed for EVAs out of the space shuttle (Pat_-Cornell, 1994) and adapted in this
report for the construction of the ISS, eight accident types were identified:
• Suit failures
• Separation
• Airlock failures
• Life support system failures
• Radiation accidents
• Industrial accidents -
• De Novo events (medical emergency that is independent of the system's performance)
• Fire in the suit
For each accident type, accident scenarios were analyzed, starting from the initiating
events and ending with outcomes that were characterized along two dimensions: the state of
the astronaut at the end of the incident/accident, and whether or not the mission for which the
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EVA was done was accomplished. In the 1994 study, we used statistics when avadable There
were, however, very few such data. Therefore, we relied heavily on expert opinions (including
those of astronauts and of the NASA technicians involved in each of the subsystems) to come
up with a risk estimate and the risk contribution of the different failure modes. The overall
result suggested that the risk of a typical shuttle EVA is comparable to the risk run by the
astronauts for each Shuttle mission (in other terms that an EVA doubles the individual risk of a
Shuttle flight). This result is consistent with the result cited by the General Accounting Office
in a memo to the Administrator dated April 1992 (Gebicke, 1992). Based in large part on
expert opinions, we also found that the probability of an astronaut's death due to debris hits
was in the order of 2.5x 10-4 per EVA.
Space debris and micro-meteorites, therefore, contribute only part of the risks of EVAs.
They are, in fact, only a part of the failure mode "suit failure" which includes other initiating
events such as a seam failure or a joint restraint failure. Based on the very soft data that we
used in this previous study for illustrative purposes, we estimated that suit failure accounted for
about 20% of the overall probability of an incident (initiating event, followed or not by an
accident). In turn, space debris represented only 5% of the probability of incidents affecting the
space suit. Clearly, the construction and maintenance of ISS 'requires EVAs in which the
astronauts will often be more exposed to particle flux than in the cargo bay of the Space
Shuttle. Also, current estimates show that the flux of orbital debris present in the ISS's orbit
will be increasing in the future.
In the present study, we computed the risk of an EVA accident due to debris and
micro-meteorites for the construction and maintenance of the ISS for a total of about 3,000
man hours of EVA. It is therefore clear that the results that we obtained and that we present
further in this report represent only a fraction of the overall EVA risks.
1.2 THE CHALLENGE OF MANAGING NEW EVA TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENTS
The goal of a complete risk analysis in the EVA context is presumably (1) to support
management decisions regarding the use of EVAs and the design of EVA missions, and (2) to
help decide whether or not to develop a new, less vulnerable space suit for activities in LEO or
planetary exploration.
The problem of whether and when to develop a new EVA technology is a general one.
A technology may become obsolete and need improvements. Gradually improving the old
system presents the advantage of avoiding the new development costs and the risks inherent to
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infancyproblemin radicallynewsystems.Theproblem,however,is that thecostsof theold
technolo_' overthe lifetimeof theprojectmaybemuchhigherthanwhata newsolutionmight
permit and also, that some aspects of the risks might be better handled by a new system. In the
case of space suits, NASA contemplated for a tong time the possibility of a shift to a hard suit.
The decision was finally made to use the existing EMU because it was then too late and too
costly to finish the development of a new suit design in time for the beginning of the
construction of the space station. Now the question is whether the existing system is safe
enough for the duration of the anticipated EVA needs related to the ISS.
At the same time as these decisions were made, the number of EVA hours considered
necessary for the construction of the space station grew in the planning stage from about 300
initially, to about 600 a few years ago, and to 905 in May 1997. In addition to these, further
hours of EVA will have to be spent for maintenance and perhaps unforeseen events during the
planned 10 year life-time of the ISS. Currently, NASA expects a total of 2,000+ EVA man-
hours during the life-span of ISS. The question is whether the actual length of the EVA work
will increase substantially, and whether the resulting risks are acceptable with the currently
available (and somehow upgraded) shuttle EMU. In general, the optimal timing of a
technological shill depends (1) on the initial cost of the shill, (2)'on the costs of operation and
maintenance of the old technology, (3) on the risks associated with the operation of the old
system, (4) on the infancy risks associated with the introduction of the new system, and (5) on
the expected performance and safety level of the new system in the long term,
The decisions that remain to be taken by NASA concerning the construction of the ISS
are thus no longer whether or not a new system will be used (the old, improved one will), or
whether the buddy system will remain in effect (all EVAs will involve at least two astronauts).
There may, however, be some further decisions to add EVA hours to the construction
operations, some decision involving the relative position of the astronaut and the station, and
opportunities to provide some shielding against directed orbital debris (as opposed to ambient
micro-meteorites). In the long run, the question of whether to continue with the current space
suit is likely to resurface and to have to be addressed again in terms of costs, risks, and
performance.
The objective of this study is to present a risk analysis methodology, focusing on orbital
debris and micro-meteorites, illustrated with the current data available from the different space
centers and from the main suit contractor in order to support further decisions concerning the
use of EVAs during the construction of the station. In Section 2, we present a general risk
analysis model for EVAs during the space station construction and operations. This model
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which involves all anticipated failure modes is adapted from the probabilistic model that was
developed a few years ago for the shuttle EVAs (Pate-Corneil, 1994), accounting tbr a
different environment, the number of planned EVA hours, the current information about debris
and micro-meteorites and the modifications that have been made to the current suit. This
model allows placing the debris problem in the larger context of the different possible accident
sequences. In Section 3, focusing on particle flux, we present the data available to us
regarding the flux of debris in lower orbit ("loads"), and the resistance ("capacities") of the
different parts of the shuttle EMU to debris of different masses, velocity, shape and impact
angle. We describe the results of studies performed at Johnson Space Center (JSC). In
Section 4, we present our model and the data that we use. The main difference between our
model and the current ones is that we also consider the possibility of penetration/resistance of
hard plates, and the effect of passive shielding by the shuttle or by the ISS. In conclusion, we
discuss the limitations and uncertainties of our model. We identify the areas where further data
gathering will be necessary and we examine some of the potential implications of our results for
the analysis of EVA management options in the ISS context.
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SECTION 2
AN OVERALL RISK ANALYSIS MODEL FOR EVAs DURING THE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE SPACE STATION
Mthough the focus of this report is on the effect of debris and micro-meteorites on the
risk of EVAs during the construction of the Space Station, this portion of the total EVA risk
needs to be put in perspective. In this section, we present an overall risk analysis model that
allows computation of the total EVA risk, to which particle penetration may contribute only a
small portion.
2. I ACCIDENT TYPES
The structure of this overall model relies on the identification of a set of accident types
similar to those that were used in the shuttle EVA risk study. These accident types are
assumed to be mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive (see'Table 2.1-1).
AT1: Suit, glove or helmet failure leading to decompression of different severity levels
(from minor leak to sudden, catastrophic and total) Includes impact of space debris and
micro meteorites as initiating events.
AT2: Separation (astronaut drit'ting away from planned site, due either to mechanical failure
or to human error)
AT3: Airlockfailure (e.g., failure of the hatch, the structure, or the pressure valves)
AT4: Life Support System failure excluding the pressure maintenance systems (included in
AT1 ): breathing problems, thermal system and communication failures, includes impact
of space debris and micro meteorites as initiating events
ATs: Radiation accidents.
AT6: Industrial accidents (e.g., glove stuck in equipment, astronaut hit by a tool)
ATT: "De novo" events (.new medical events that could occur elsewhere as well; e.g., cardiac
failure or nausea)
ATs: Fire inside the suit caused by oxygen ignition (initiated by short circuit or frictions)
ATI in bold: Accident types involving particle penetration
Table 2.1-1: Classification of accident types (ATi) for the PRA model (Pate-Cornell, 1994)
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Two of the accident types involve impact bv debris and micro-meteorites as possible
initiating events: AT1 (failure of the suit, glove or helmet), and AT4 (failure of the life support
system) The overall risk analysis model can be represented by the influence diagram of Figure
"_ 1-1.
AT2
Separahon
ATI
Suit Failure
AT3
Airlock Failure
AT4
Life Support
System Failure
AT5
Radiation
Accident
End State of
Astronaut
AT6
ltxdustrial
Accident
AT7
De novo events
Locadon
of
incident
AT8
Fire in suit
Figure 2.1-1: Influence diagram of overall model of accident types and outcomes (state of the
astronaut and status of the mission, i.e., EVA job).
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2.2 OUTCOMES
The model of Figure 2.1-1 indicates that the state of the astronaut and the status of the
EVA job given an initiating event depends on the accident type (characterized by its level of
severity), and on the location of the incident (described by the distance between the astronaut
and the closest airlock). The outcomes of the possible accident scenarios are described in Table
2.1-2 They are defined by the state of the astronaut (death or severe brain damage, alive or
light injury), and the status of the EVA work (accomplished or canceled).
We do not explicitly consider here property or equipment damage, or less severe
astronaut injury. The models, however, can be easily extended to several intermediate states if
justified.
OCI
0C2:
0C3
0C4:
Recovery (with or without minor astronaut injury). EVA work accomplished (Code
notation: AOK, WA)
Loss of EVA work without astronaut casualty (no death or serious injury) (AOK, WO)
Astronaut casualty without loss of EVA work (AD, WA)
Loss of EVA work with astronaut casualty (AD WO).
Table 2.1-2: Outcomes of the possible accident scenarios
2.3 ACCIDENT SCENARIOS
For each accident type (e.g., decompression), failure scenarios are analyzed. This
analysis starts with each possible initiating event (i.e., the first incident that starts the accident
process in orbit), then the sequences of events that can follow this initiator, ranging from the
detection and fixing of a minor problem to a catastrophic event from which recovery is
impossible. This second phase can involve a dynamic analysis based on stochastic processes
since the time factor is often critical to human survival. For each sequence of events, one
computes the probability that it ends in several possible consequence categories, conditional on
the initiating event. The probability of each scenario is obtained by multiplying the marginal
probability of the initiating event and the probabilities of different outcomes conditional on the
initiating event. This is done by multiplying the probabilities of a sequence of intermediate
events and variables, all conditioned on those that precede them in the scenario.
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2.4 PROBABILITY COMPUTATION
The probability of each outcome is then computed by summing the probabilities of the
accident sequences leading to that outcome. One may want to proceed to further treatment of
uncertainty by defining, instead of the probability of various outcomes per EVA, the future
frequencies of the different outcomes and treating these future frequencies as random variables.
This approach may be desirable to provide a measure of the uncertainties involved given that
there is little information on EVA risk. For simplicity, however, this preliminary study is limited
to first-order probabilities per flight.
The success or failure of a mission conditional on the occurrence of an incident is linked
to the location of the astronaut at the time of the initiating event. The different phases of the
EVA are defined as shown on the time axis of Figure 2. "fit" represents the very short time
following the exit of the alrlock when a decompression accident can occur if there is a defect in
the space suit itself, or if it has not been properly assembled. For each of the EVA phases, an
important factor in the assessment of the probability of particle hits is the level of shielding
given the position of the astronaut with respect to the space station or to the cargo bay of the
space shuttle (at the beginning of the construction program).
Notations:
ATt:
IE,j:
OCk:
p(.):
p(.I.):
p(.,.):
Accident types
Initiating events (indexed in ij) within each accident type
Outcomes (Four classes and indexed in k)
Probability of an event
Conditional probability of second event given the first
Joint probability of two events.
PHASE 0: PHASE 1: PHASE 2: PHASE 3:
Vaccum in Traasfer to EVA Task Return to
Air Lock _, Task Site Air Lock
EXIT ENTRY
PHASE 4:
A
Repressurization Time
of Air Lock
Figure 2.4-1: Different phases of the EVA (Phase 0 to Phase 4)
Assuming that the initiating events within each accident type are mutually exclusive and
collectively exhaustive, the probability of each accident type is the sum of the probabilities of
the initiating events that trigger the accident type:
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p(AT) = _ p (IE 0)
J
(2.1-1)
The risk is characterized by the overall probability distribution of the outcomes
described by the four possibilities of Table 2. The overall probability of each outcome is the
sum for all accident types of the probabilities of outcome and accident type:
p(OCk) = _ p(ATi) x p(Oek] AT,) (2.1-2)
i
Therefore, characterizing each accident type by its set of initiating events:
p(OCk) = _ _ p([Eij ) x p(OCkllE,j )
ij
(2.1-3)
The initiating events (IEij) for each accident type ATi are subdivided into several
categories (severity level, incident characteristics, etc.). Each of accident initiators is then
described by its possible realizations. For instance, one of the initiating events of AT, (failure
of the suit, glove or helmet) is the impact of debris or micro-meteorites. It could be subdivided
into different event categories describing both the size of the particle and the angle of impact.
At the time of the space shuttle EVA study (1994), no angles of impact were
considered for particle penetrations of the EMU Yet, when focusing on the effect of particle
hits on the space suit, the impact angle is likely to play a role: a shallow angle may permit the
particle to be reflected by the surface. The probability of a hit of different categories depends
on the time spent by the astronaut at different levels of shielding, which itself may depend on
the phase of the EVA as shown in Figure 2.1-2. The effect of shielding on the EVA outcome
depends both on the part of the suit that is hit (soft goods vs hard plates) and, for a severe but
survivable hit, on the distance to the airlock, as the time available to bring the astronaut back to
Station pressure might be critical.
v
Each of the accident types and each of the initiating events within an accident type may
require a different risk analysis model. Some of these models are described in the 1994 report
by their respective influence diagram and apply to the ISS as well (e.g., separation).
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SECTION 3
PENETRATION RISKS OF EMU: CURRENT STATE OF RESEARCH
A great deal of research has taken place in the different space centers to gather the
information necessary for the analysis of the contribution of orbital particles to the EVA risk.
In this section, we summarize the state of these data.
During some EVA operations, the astronauts will operate outside the protection of the
space shuttle or the ISS, exposing themselves to the particle flux of orbital debris and micro-
meteorites present in LEO. For safety purposes, two astronauts will be active at the same time
in the vicinity of the space shuttle or the space station (the buddy system). Current estimates
for the total amount of EVA man-hours are in the range of 2,600h (i.e. 2 astronauts at 1,300h
each). As mentioned earlier, this number has changed in the past and we expect it to be
modified again in the future. There is a direct relation between probability of particle
penetration for the EMU and total EVA time, albeit not necessarily a linear one as particle flux
is expected to vary in the future. It is therefore important to assess the probability of particle
hits and penetrations during EVA operations for the management of both the shuttle EVAs and
the construction of the space station.
Models of both orbital debris and micro-meteorite flux have been developed by NASA.
Employing these models, we can calculate the probability of particle hits for objects orbiting in
LEO. Given the probability of a particle hit, its energy, and the penetration characteristics of
the EMU, we can calculate the probability of penetration. Unfortunately, there are still large
areas of insufficient knowledge concerning the materials and physical processes involved (e.g.
penetration of different suit materials at different velocities and impact angles). This gap calls
for extensive research in the area of particle flux and space suit impact characteristics. The
particle flux present in LEO varies with altitude and, to a lesser extent, with inclination. While
the flux stemming from meteorites and large debris is well documented, the same is not true for
small and medium orbital debris (less than 10cm in diameter) which can be critical to EVA
safety. More research into the sources of small and medium debris is needed.
14
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In this section we analyze the loads and the capacitiesof the system under
consideration.Theloadsconsideredhereare theparticlesimpactingthe EMU, i.e. the micro-
meteoriteand orbital debrisparticle flux. The capacityof the systemis the suit's ability to
withstandtheimpactsof theseparticleswithout losingits ability to providelife supportfor the
astronaut.Oncethe loadexceedsthecapacity,the systemfails. Generally,the probabilityof
systemfailurecanbeexpressedasfollows:
p(Failure)-- p(Loads> Capacities,overtotal exposuretime)
It is thereforeimportantto havereliabledatafor thesystem'scapacityandtheloadsto
which it mightbeexposedovertime. Uncertaintiesaboutthe loads(or capacity)automatically
resultinuncertaintiesabouttheprobabilityof failure_.
3.1 LOADS:THE FLUX MEASUREMENTS
The particle flux to which astronauts are exposed in LEO consists of micro-meteorites
and orbital debris. Meteorites are natural objects orbiting the sun and passing through the
earth's orbit. Orbital debris are man-made objects in Earth orbit that are non-functional. They
include spent rocket bodies, nonfunctional spacecratts, fragmentation debris and mission-
related debris (e.g. exhaust products from solid rockets). Generally, micro-meteorite particles
are of lower density than orbital debris (roughly by a factor of 2), but travel at higher velocity.
Micro-meteorite flux is dependent on the altitude and inclination of EVA operations as
well as calendar time (solar activity). Orbital debris flux depends on altitude and inclination of
EVA activities and on recent orbital incidents. As a result of these parameters, the flux of
particles will vary over the life time of the space station (mainly due to the meteorite flux
related to solar activity and additional orbital debris). Current estimates predict that during the
scheduled life of the ISS, the particle flux will be at its peak in 2009. The models developed by
NASA for particle flux in LEO take these variations and other particle characteristics into
consideration. The US Space Command monitors and catalogues all known objects in LEO
that are of diameter 10cm..or larger. For smaller sizes, however, no exhaustive monitoring is
possible and only samples of the population can be taken (allowing to estimate the population
size).
By this we mean uncertainty about the probabilities - having an estimate of p(Failure) = 25% to 30% clearly
is superior to having an estimate of p(Failure) -- 20% to 60%
15
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Size Number of Objects
8, 000
Percent Number Percent Mass
I0- cm 0.02% 99.93%
1 - 10 cm 110,000" 0.31% 0.035%
O. 1 - 1 cm 35,000,000" 99.67% 0.035%
Total 35, 118,000 100.00% 2,000,000 kg
Source: G.M Levin, Office of Space Flight, 1996
Statistically estimated value
Table 3.1-1 : Estimated Debris Population
Due to increasing space activity, the amount of orbital debris will increase at a rate greater
than the natural decrease due to atmospheric re-entry. With an increasing number of spacecraft
orbiting Earth, the probability of collisions of spacecraft also increases (e.g. collision of
satellites 18208 and 23606 on July 24, 1996). Debris clouds resulting from these collisions
are considerable and pose a threat to other orbiting objects.
In its 1995 Interagency Report, the National Science and Technology Council published
estimates of orbital debris and meteorites orbiting Earth at altitudes of up to 2,000kin It is
estimated that 1,000 kg of mass is orbiting Earth in the form of debris of diameter sizes of less
than 1.0 cm, 300 kg of which are attributable to orbital debris smaller than 0.1 cm in diameter
The total mass of meteorites in these orbits is estimated at 200kg. This makes the orbital
debris environment more hazardous than the micro-meteorite environment.
Data retrieved from space-shuttle flights show that during a total of 592 mission days, 313
relevant impacts took place in the windows area of the shuttle (i.e. producing pits or even
window replacements). The total window area of the shuttle is 3 m 2, which is comparable to
the surface area of the EMU and therefore a first estimate for the number of expected impacts.
Two of these shuttle window impacts would have had sufficient energy to penetrate the sof_
parts of the EMU. The effect of shielding, however, may be different for the shuttle windows
and astronauts during planned shuttle EVAs.
3.2 CAPACITIES: EMU VULNERABILITY TO PARTICLE HITS
During EVAs, the EMU has to provide astronauts with life support while protecting
them against the environment. One of the environmental threats is that of being hit by a high-
velocity particle. The space suit currently used by NASA consists of various types of
16
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materials Its penetrationcharacteristicscanbe broadlycategorizedinto soft partsand hard
parts. Soft partsarepartsthat areonly protectedby theThermalMeteoriteGarment(TMG)
andthatarenot coveredbymetalor plasticplates.With thecurrentdesign,roughly2/3 of the
suit's surface area consist of soft parts. Soft parts are used to cover the feet, legs, arms and
hands of the astronaut. These areas are more easily penetrated by high-velocity particles than
hard parts. The soft parts of the EMU can support a hole of not more than 4ram in diameter
for 30 minutes (i.e. the astronaut will have sufficient oxygen pressure during that time). Any
hole larger than this would be critical.
The following table shows the surface areas for the parts that constitute the space
shuttle suit (Cour-Palais, 1996). The element's failure criteria are listed. For the elements
consisting of TMA and bladder (soft parts), there are two failure criteria: a penetration hole of
at least 4ram diameter, resulting in a critical incident - or a leak of less than 4ram in diameter,
which would be non-critical. The 4ram threshold appears to be a step function, but in reality, it
is not. For all other elements any spall or leak would be critical.
Elements
Boots
Gloves
Lower Legs
Upper Legs
Lower Arms
Upper Arms
Waist Brief
Helmet&Visors
HUT
[D&CM
PLSS: Valves etc.
PLSS: CCC
PLSS: Battery Cover
PLSS: Pmary Gox
PLSS: Secondary Gox
Sizing, ltjn_s
Material
Layup
TMG +Bladder
TMG + Bladder
TMG_- Bladder
TMG + Bladder
TMG + Bladder
TMG + B ladder
TMG+ Bladder
Lexan +P olysulfone
TMG+ Fiberglas
TMG+ 1.6ram Alumin.
TMG+ 1.6mm Alumin.
TMG+ 2.3ram Alumin.
TMG + O,46ram A lumm
TMG+ 3.6ram Alumin.
TMG* 1.8mm Alumin.
TMG+ 3.2ram Alumin.
Failure
Criteri a
NL & 4ram
NL & 4ram
NL & 4ram
NL & 4ram
NL & 4ram
NL & 4ram
NL
NPS
NPS
NPS
NPS
NL & 4ram
NPS
NPS
NPS
VPS
S. Area
lm^21
0.46
0.10
O.60
0.26
0.38
0.28
0.23
0.21
0.12
O.05
0.31
0.07
0.03
0.24
0.24
variable
(NPS: No Perforation or Spall; NL: No Leak; HUT: Hard Upper Torso; D&CM: Display
& Control Module; PLSS: Portable Life Support System; CCC: Containment Control
Carmdge; CA)X: GaseousOxygen)
Source: Cour-Palais, 1996
Table 3.2-1 The Space Shuttle Suit Elements
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Hard pans consist of some form of metal sheet or plastic (in the case of the helmet),
covered by the same TMG as the soft pans of the suit. Hard parts protect the LSS on the back
of the astronaut, the display and control module on the chest of the astronaut as well as the
astronaut's helmet.
To estimate the effect of high-velocity impacts (FIVI) on soft parts, high-velocity
impact tests have been performed at AMES. The tests subjected the suit material to impacts of
nylon spheres (1.14 g/cc, representing micro-meteorite panicles) and aluminum panicles
(2788/cc, representing debris panicles). The test data were then analyzed and a functional
relationship between the kinetic energy of the penetrating panicle and the resulting hole
diameter was developed (Cour-Palais 1996). These formulae are only applicable for the soil
pans of the suits.
Shot Nr. Mat. Diam. Mass Speed Energ_ Result
,-12905 AI
A2894 AI
A2896 AI
A2897 AI
A2900 AI
A2907 AI
A2910 A1
A2911 A1
A2912 A1
A2929 A1
A2930 AI
A2931 AI
A2932 AI
A2933 AI
Angle V.Enerev
[mm] [g] [km/s] [J] [deg] [J]
0.299 0.000311 6.85 5.25 0 5.25
0.300 0.000314 7.00 5.54 0 5.54
0.392 0.000701 6.90 12.01 0 12.01
0.404 0.000768 6.68 12.32 0 12.32
0.500 0.001456 7.03 25.88 0 25.88
0.600 0.002515 6.95 43.70 0 43.70
0.599 0.002503 5.79 30.18 0 30.18
0.520 0.001637 4.35 11.14 0 11.14
0.794 0.005829 5.23 57.35 0 57.35
0.407 0.000785 6.95 13.64 30 11.81
0.495 0.001412 6.84 23.77 30 20.58
0.608 0.002617 7.18 48.53 30 42.03
0.517 0.001609 5.66 18.54 30 16.06
0.404 0.000768 7.11 13.96 45 9.87
[Bladder]
No Hole
No Hole
'No Hole
No Hole
No Hole
Pinhole
Hole (1.3mm)
No Hole
Hole (2.5x2.1 mm)
No Hole
Pinhole
Hole (0.5mm)
Hole (0.8ram)
No Hole
(Specific mass of Aluminum: 2.78/cm3;
[m/sl)
KineticEnergy: _ m v2 with m measured in [kg] and v measured in
Source: Kosmo, Joseph
Table 3.2-2: Results of HVI tests
For the hard parts of the suit (aluminum sheets, covered by TMG), no closed functional
relationships have been developed so far. Instead, a combination of formulae is used: a
formula derived by Fish and Summers in 1967 for the penetration of metal sheets and a formula
for the penetration of the TMG (the same formula is used for the soft part of the suit). We use
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theseformulaein section4. Basedon theseformulae,Cour-Palaiscalculatedtheballisticlimits
for the hard partsof the suit. Theseballistic lirrutsareestimates.At this point, thereareno
penetrationtestsavailablefor theTMG coveredhardpartsof thesuit.
3.3 CURRENT RESULTS
Calculations of probabilities of penetration rely on four sources: Hodgeson (1993),
Cour-Palais (1996), ORDEM96 (1996) and SSP30425A (1991).
Hodgeson, an employee of Hamilton-Standard, the company that produces the current
space suit, found that the probability of penetration of the hard parts of the EMU is negligible
compared to the probability of penetration of the soft parts. Cour-Palais developed the
formulae for penetration of the soft parts and the estimated the ballistic limits (i.e. the kinetic
energy necessary for suit penetration) for the hard parts of the suit. Finally, ORDEM96 and
SSP30425 are used for the calculation of the flux of orbital debris and meteorites in LEO,
respectively.
Orbital Debris Impact at lOkm/s:
Diameter [cml Mass[gl Energy [J]
0.03 0.0000 1.9156
0.04 0.0001 4.5406
0.05 0.0002 8.8685
0.06 0.0003 15.3247
0.07 0.0005 24.3350
0.08 0.0007 36.3252
0.09 0.0010 51.7208
0.10 0.0014 70.9476
0.11 0.0019 94.4313
0.12 0.0025 122.5975
0.13 0.0031 155.8720
0.14 0.0039 194.6803
0.15 0.0048 239.4483
Table 3.3-1: Impact energies of orbital
debris particles
Cour-Palais (1996) provides formulae to calculate the kinetic energies necessary to
penetrate the various parts of the EMU. For orbital debris, a level of 75 J would be sufficient to
penetrate any part of the suit (including hard parts). From table 3.3-1 we conclude that any
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debris particle of diameter0.[l cm and larger would have sufficient kinetic energy-'for
penetration.Thismeansthat aparticleof little morethan lmmin diameterwouldpenetrateany
partof theEMU andmostlikelyresultina fatalaccident.
To obtaintheballisticlimits for penetrationof the hardparts,Cour-Palaisusedresults
obtainedfrom I_q testson aluminumsheetsandthe resultsobtainedfor the soft partsof the
suit (penetrationof theTMG). He thencombinedthesedatato calculatetheresultsfor hard
parts,shownin table3.3-2.
ORDEM96isa FORTRAN-basedcomputercodethat canbe runon DOSPC's.It was
developedby Kessleret al. at JSC.Thecoderequiresvariousinputsconcerningtheobjectin
orbit andtakesinto considerationa growth rateof orbitaldebris.The code's output is the flux
data for a given range of particle diameters.
Suit Element.
Arms&Legs
Arms&Legs
Boots&Gloves
Boots&Gloves
Sizing Rings
HUT
Waist(Brief)
Helmet&Visor
D&CM
D&CM
PLSS: Primary GOX
PLSS: Secondary GOX
PLSS: CCC
PLSS: CCC
PLSS: Battery Cover
PLSS: Valves etc.
PLSS: Valves etc.
Failure Mod.e Meteorite Debris
No Leak 3.4 3.2
4 mm Hole 68.0 56:0
No Leak 3.4 3.2
4 mm Hole 68.0 56.0
No SpallA, eak 47.6 39.3
No Spall/Leak 70.0 44.0
No Leak 3.4 3.2
No Spall/Leak 167.0 71.0
Not Critical NA NA
No SpallfLeak 11.5 10.0
No Spall/Leak 75.0 60.4
No Spall/T, eak 15.4 13.4
No Spall/Leak 25.5 21.4
4 mm Hole 172.0 71.0
No Spall/Leak 3.5 3.5
Not Critical NA NA
No Spall,rLeak 11.5 I0.0
Source: Cour-Palais, 1996
Table 3.3-2: Ballistic Limits of Suit Elements
: We follow standard procedure and assume a relative velocity of 10km/s for orbital debris particles
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SSP30425A (1991) was released by the Space Station Freedom Program Office in
Reston, Virginia. It defines the natural environment for the space station's design. Paragraph
8 deals with meteorites and orbital debris. The formulae stated therein allow to calculate the
flux of meteontes in LEO (the debris model of SSP30425 has been updated in ORDEM96 and
therefore, we use ORDEM96 data to model the debris flux).
Based on SSP30425, Simonds (1996) developed a Monte-Carlo simulator that
calculates the probability of no penetration for the soft parts of the space suit. Simonds
computes the probability of no penetration (PNP) over a time period of 2,172 hours (estimate
for total EVA during life-time of ISS) of EVA to be in the range 0.69 - 0.90 This result
includes penetrations that are non-critical, due to their small size. Simonds' estimate for the
probability of no critical penetration 3 (PNCP) over that time period is 0.984 - 0.994 (with a
best estimate of 0.992).
At the Micro-Meteorite and Orbital Debris Summit organized by the EVA project
office in June 1996, a limit of acceptable risk was defined. The probability of no penetration
(PNP) was set to PNP = 0.92 over 10 years of operation of the US segment of the space
station. Simonds' results indicate that this level cannot be obtained by the current design of the
space suit. However, he also indicates that the AX-5 Ames space suit is superior to the current
space suit in some of the critical aspects. He refers in particular to the AX-5 Ames suit
component that was used in tests of the advanced space suit in penetration tests. This part was
superior to the corresponding part in the space shuttle suit.
The data available for the penetration of the space suit fabric are not conclusive: the
number of tests is small, no penetration tests of TMG with metal plate are available, the
possibility of suit ignition was not fully investigated, and the physical and psychological effects
of suit penetration on astronauts is poorly known. Yet, the main factor of uncertainty is the
flux of orbital debris in LEO: a high level of uncertainty about the loads (i.e. debris flux)
necessarily implies a high level of uncertainty in the risk analysis results (i.e., the probability of
suit penetration over time).
3 'Non-Critical" refers to a situation where the astronaut is not severely injured or killed
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SECTION 4
PROBABILISTIC RISK ANALYSIS OF EMU PENETRATION
4.1 EVAS
EVAs will be conducted during the construction and operation of the ISS Each EVA
involves different phases that are relevant to the probability of particle penetration. We have
identified these phases as: "leaving the hatch", "transition to the operation area", "activities in
the operation area" and "transition back to the hatch". During some of these phases, the
astronaut will be shielded to some degree by the space shuttle or the ISS. During other times,
he/she will not be shielded and will operate in open space.
Orbital debris will be approaching the astronaut from the direction of the ISS's velocity
vector, while the micro-meteorite flux is omni-directional. This implies that passive protection
measures will have significant impact on the probability of debris hits, but less so regarding
meteorite hits. Therefore, the meteorite flux will only decrease slightly if the astronaut
operates "behind" the shuttle while the debris flux will be noticeably smaller.
In the case of a particle hit during an EVA, there are four different possible outcomes:
a) the particle does not penetrate the EMU, no damage is done
b) the particle penetrates the EMU but is non-critical (i.e. hole of less than 4mm in the a
soft part of the suit) and the astronaut reaches the hatch
c) the particle penetrates the EMU and creates a hole of more than 4mm in diameter (soft
part) - but the astronaut can still reach the hatch in time
d) the particle penetrates the EMU and immediately kills the astronaut or the astronaut is
not able to reach the hatch before his LSS falls to function
The outcomes depend on the kinetic energy of the particle, its impact angle, the part of
the suit being hit and the astronaut's distance to the hatch of the shuttle or the ISS. Given that
the particle penetrates the suit, the performance of the LSS is also relevant (i.e. will the
secondary GOX provide enough oxygen to get the astronaut back to the hatch?).
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Our model is represented by the influence diagram 4, shown in figure 4.2-1. The model
simulates the LEO environment for the ISS. We use the data obtained from the space shuttle
vdndow impacts (313 hits in 592 mission days) to assess the hourly probability of impact
during EVAs The impact data for the shuttle mission were gathered in orbits that are different
from the planned orbit of ISS, but presumably, the shuttle orbits have a lower particle flux than
the planned ISS orbit (therefore, we are conservative).
Figure 4.2-1: The PRA Model
4 An influence diagram is a graphical tool that represents the structural level of the decision problem; it is
mainly used for communication purposes between the decision maker and the decision analyst
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Model evaluation: Given that an impact occurs _ we evaluate whether shielding if
effective or not. If no shielding is effective, we compute the energy of the impacting panicle
and identify the part of the suit being hit. Given the impact energy and the part of the suit
being hit, we can calculate whether there is penetration or not. If there is penetration, we
check whether there is ignition or not. If there is no ignition, we check whether the LSS is
working properly or not and we calculate the remaining oxygen supply (in minutes). We then
compare this quantity to the amount of oxygen needed to get to the hatch (never more than 30
minutes).
Data sources: Given that an impact occurs (we use the shuttle window impact statistics
for the analysis of uncertainties), we use ORDEM96 data and the formulae in SSP30425 to
assess the diameter distribution of orbital debris and meteorites respectively. We calculate (by
using ORDEM and SSP30425) the flux of particles that are large enough (or larger) to
penetrate the soft parts of the EMU Both ORDEM96 and SSP30425 provide us with
cumulative flux estimates, that is, flux data for particles of a given size and larger. Based on
these flux calculations, we compute the conditional probabilities for each diameter class as its
contribution to the overall particle-flux 6. Throughout these computations, we assume an
impact velocity of 10km/s for debris and 20km/s for meteorites. We simulate impacts at
various angles and we calculate the vertical (normal to the surface) impact velocity 7. Based on
a function the vertical impact velocity, the particle type and diameter and the part of the suit
being hit, we calculate the hole diameter (soft parts) or check the ballistic limit for penetration
(hard parts). The formulae for the hole diameters due to impacts in sott parts areS(Ep, the
kinetic impact energy 9, measured in [J]):
Hole diameter due to impact by micro-meteorite:
DH = O.00153 * Ep m" [cm] (4.2-1a)
Hole diameter due to impact by orbital debris:
DH = O.00176 * Ep TM [cm] (4.2-1b)
s Based on the data gathered from window impacts on shuttle missions, we calculated a probability of
0.007m:hr t for a a particle hit during EVA
6 We calculate the relative weight of each diameter class within the total flux, e.g. "85% of the total flux is due
to particles of size 0.01cm"
' The exact formula is Vvertical= [cos(v)] °'2 (Hodgeson, 1997, private communication)
Cour-Palais, 1996
Ep = 0.5*m'v2: rn in [kgl, v in [m/s]
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If a hardpart is penetrated,a critical incidentoccurs. If a soft part is penetrated,x_e
evaluatethe distanceto the hatch(in minutes)andcompareit to the minutesof ox'y.genlet_,
taking into accountthe sizeof the hole. Finally, we introducea small probabilityof LSS
failure,giventhatthereisa holeina sot_part.
For probabilisticcalculations,the flux of orbital debrisand micro-meteoritescanbe
assumedto beprobabilisticallyindependent.Thisallowsus to model thesetwo phenomena
separatelyand,oncethis isdone,to calculatetheoverallprobabilityof aparticlehit.
We usea cut-off thresholdfor particlesof diameter0.01cm,i.e. particlesof smaller
diameterswere not consideredin this model astheir impactenergywasbelow the level of
penetrationof soft parts. We calculatethepercentageof total flux attributablerespectivelyto
debrisand meteoritesby runningORDEM96and usingthe formulaein SSP30425(roughly
60:40).Theformulaefor meteorite-fluxin SSP30425Aare:
FP_(m),theinterplanetaryflux at oneA.U.:
Fp/m ) : Co{¢ gmO.Z06._¢ _-,.38 *- ¢3(m ÷ c4m 2 + c5m4) "0"36+ c6(m + 7¢m2)°85 
co = 3. 156"10^7 c_ = IOAII
cl = 2.2"10/'3 c5 = 10A27
c_ = 15 c6 = 1.3"10^-16
c3 = 1.3"10/'-9 c7 = 10^6
(4.2-2)
st, the shielding factor:
Sf
sin(#)
RE
H
= [1 _- cos(,7)]/2
= Re/(RE ÷ H)
= Earth radius + lOOkm atmosphere (6478km)
= Height above Earth's atmosphere (height of atmosphere lOOkm)
(4.2-3)
GE, the focussing factor of the Earth's gravitational field:
GE = 1 + (R_'r)
r = Orbit Radius (6378km. 400kin)
(4.2-4)
F_(m), the integral flux of particles of mass m or larger, tumbling surface in Earth's orbit:
Fr(m) = sf* GE *lZ'Pr(m) (4. 2-5)
The Probabilistic Risk Analysis in this report includes the probabilities of penetration of
hard parts of the Space Shuttle Suit. This had not been done so far, based on the assumption
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that the hard parts of the suit are not critical (see Section 3 for details). Furthermore. _e
include the effects of shielding of the astronauts in EVAs. The data that we used can be
divided mto flux data (loads), suit data (capacities), and time (exposure).
Our model was run on a Pentium Pro with 64MB of RAM and a 200MHz CPU We
used C_'stal Ball TM, an Excel TM add-on, for the simulation part.
The following list describes each of the variables of the influence diagram in more
detail. Random variables are assigned a distribution. Variables that are deterministic are
variables that represent results of functional evaluations of other variables. For example,
"Penetration" depends on all the variables that are connected to the node ("bubble") that
represents penetration in the influence diagram.
• Hit: A debris particle or a micro-meteorite hits the space suit; we do not consider particles
of diameters less than 0.01 cm as their impact energy is not sufficient enough to penetrate
any part of the space suit. Distribution: Bernoulli (p), based on windows impact during
space shuttle missions (limitation: no consideration of variation of probability of hit over
time)
• Angle: The impact angle is measured against the axis perpend!cular to the surface being hit;
an angle of 0 degree is perpendicular, while an
angle of 90 degrees is tangential to the surface
area. Distribution: Beta (1, l 0), multiplied by 90 o
OD Diametert°: Particles of different sizes and
velocities hit the space suit; we assume an impact
velocity of 10km/s for orbital debris. We use the
data that we obtained from running ORDEM96 for
diameters 0.03cm to 0.13 cm. Any orbital debris
particle of diameter larger than 0. l I cm has enough
kinetic energy to penetrate any part of the EMU.
Therefore, we did not deem it necessary to include
particle diameters of larger than 0.13cm
Distribution: Custom (discrete)
H24
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r_
3,
_o The dismbution for the particle diameter was derived from the ORDEM96 output for the ISS orbit.
ORDEM96 provided us with flux data for a given diameter size and larger(e.g, the flux for particles of 0.03 cm
and larger is 1.04E-01 m'2yr"1, the flux for particles O.04cm and larger is 0.0276 m'2yr't); we calculated the
flux for a set of diameters and then calculated the flux for intervals of 0.01cm (e.g. 0.0276 m2yr 1 for the
interval 0.03 to 0.04 cm); finally we calculated the distribution to be the percentage of flux, attributable to each
of the intervals. We followed a similar procedure for the diameter distribution of meteorites.
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• .MM Diameter: Particles of different sizes and
velocities hit the space suit; we assume an impact
velocity of 20km/s for micro-meteorites. We
calculated the flux for a range of particle diameters,
starting at 0.03cm and including 0.13cm Any
meteorite particle of that diameter or larger has
enough kinetic energy to penetrate any part of the
EMU. Therefore, we did not include any particles of
larger diameters. Distribution: Custom (discrete)
• Part of Suit: The area of the suit being hit by the
particle. We make use of the test data available in
Cour-Palais (1996), and we distinguish between 4
different parts of the suit: soft parts, primary GOX,
HUT and helmet/visor. We assume that the
conditional probability of impact location on the
EMU, given there is an impact, is proportional to the
percentage of surface area covered by that part of the
suit. Distribution: Custom (discrete)
Pate-Cornell and Sachon
I
o o30
| I .
MM Diameter
o"098 120
Part of Suit
I I
075 1 50 225
I
3 O0
• LSS: The performance of the life support system in case of suit penetration, given that the
LSS is not the EMU part being penetrated. If the LSS is penetrated, then we have a fatal
accident and the astronaut is dead before he can reach the hatch. If, however, the LSS is
not the suit element that is being penetrated, then we assume its performance to be
independent of which part of the suit has been penetrated. By this, we want to consider
that there is a chance of malfunction of the LSS when it is called upon in an emergency
mode. For this failure, we assume a conditional probability of 2 in 1000 (Pate-Cornell,
1994). Distribution: Bernoulli (0.002)
• Penetration: Penetration of the suit depends on 4 variables - "Part of Suit", "Hit", impact
energy (which is a function of"Diameter" and "Angle") and "Shielding". If there is no hit,
there is no penetration. If there is a hit, but shielding is effective, there is no penetration.
Given there is a hit and shielding is ineffective, the probability of penetration depends on
impact energy and on the part of the suit being hit. Deterministic Variable (Formula)
• Time Elapsed (Time_E): Oxygen time elapsed between start of EVA and particle impact.
Since a particle impact can occur at any time during the EVA, we assume a uniform
distribution for this variable (we have no data that would indicate otherwise). Distribution:
Uniform [0, Total Oxygen]
27
Pate-CornetlandSachon
• Time Remaining (Time_R): The time left during which the astronaut will have sufficient
oxygen pressure This variable depends on "Time Elapsed" (Time_E), the state of the life
support system "'LSS", the amount of oxygen available at the beginning of the EVA 'Total
Oxygen", and "'Penetration". The formula can be found in Appendix C. Deterministic
variable (Formula)
• Ignition: Because the atmosphere in the suit is composed of pure oxygen, it is highly
susceptible to ignitions; this variable captures the possibility of an ignition due to
penetration of the bladder. We set this conditional probability to be 1 in 1,000 (Pate-
Corneil, 1994). Distribution: Bernoulli (0.001)
• Time Needed (Time_N): Time needed is the oxygen time required for the astronaut to get
back to the hatch. We assume it to be the minimum of 30 minutes and the remaining
mission time (we assume that at any point during the EVA, the maximum distance between
the astronaut and the closest hatch is 30 oxygen minutes). The formula can be found in
Appendix C. Deterministic variable (Formula)
• Astronaut State: Depending on the possibility of penetration, on the state of the LSS and
the time needed to get to the hatch, the astronaut can be OK or severely injured/dead The
formula can be found in Appendix C. Deterministic variable (Formula)
• Total Oxygen: Total amount of oxygen available to astronaut at the start of an EVA
(excluding the secondary GOX), measured in minutes. Deterministic variable (Parameter)
• Shielding: During most of their EVAs the astronauts will be partly shielded against
panicles by the space shuttle or the ISS. For each of these cases, we define a percentage of
flux that can be shielded against by the structure (i.e. if there is no shielding, the astronaut
will be exposed to 100% of the panicle flux; if there is shielding by the ISS, he/she will be
shielded against 1/3 of the incoming meteorites and 9/10 of the incoming debris). The flux
factors are listed in table 42-1 (Effective Flux = Incoming Flux * Flux Factor). These
numbers are the result of an estimated guess, as we had no data on this factor at this point
in the study. Distribution: Bernoulli(p)
Shuttle MM [%] OD [%] Time [%]0.333 0.100 0.250
[ISS _ 0.667 0.100 0.500
I
[None i1.000 1.000 0.250
Table 4.2-1: Flux Factors
Particle: Micro-meteorite or orbital debris. Due to their different penetration
characteristics, meteorite and debris panicles have to modeled separately. We use an
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estimated guess of a 60% and 40°o ratio for debris and meteorite percentage of total
particle flux. Distribution: Bernoulli(0 6)
Therefore, there are two main points of concern in the data that we used in our model:
a) Flux data: We used flux data from the shuttle window impacts for the impact
probability of particles of a kinetic energy of 3J or more (the kinetic energy necessary
to puncture the soft part of the EMU - this diameter is the limit below which the
formulae of Cour-Palais (1996) indicate no penetration). Since particles with impact
energies of less than 3J create visible effects in the shuttle windows, the use of this data
might be an overestimation. Also, we used relative weights derived from ORDEM96
data and SSP30425 formulae to estimate the conditional probabilities of particle
diameter, given there is an impact (see footnote on page 24).
b) Shielding: We "guesstimated" the effects of shielding as well as the amounts of time
spent in each environment (Table 4.2-1). Once reliable data are available, the
estimation of these variables can be improved.
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SECTION 5
RESULTS
5.1 FINDINGS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE MODEL
In the model that we developed, we used data from different sources (Christiansen,
1996; Cour-Palais, 1996; Hodgeson, 1993; Kessler et al, 1996; Simonds, 1997 to name a few).
We improved the existing models in the following way. First, we included in our risk
computations the hard parts of the EMU. Second, we considered the effects of shielding.
Third, we extended the risk analysis framework to place the risk of particle hits in the
perspective of the overall EVA risk. We did not run this overall model (which was outside our
scope), but it is clear that particle hits constitute only a part (and probably a minor one) of the
overall EVA risk.
The simulation runs of our model show that the overall probability of a fatal or near-
fatal accident (i.e. astronaut dead or severely injured) due to a hit by orbital debris or micro-
meteorite is below 2% for an exposure of 3,000 hours of EVA. This figure, which includes
penetration of both hard and soft parts of the EMU, is below the threshold set by current
NASA guidelines and is consistent with NASA findings (Simonds, 1996). Our simulation runs
also indicated that the probability of an accident due to penetration of a soft part dominates the
probability of penetration of a hard part. The hard parts of the EMU therefore seem to
contribute a larger part of risk of fatal accidents than has been previously expected, but this
could be attributed in part to the uncertainties regarding the particle flux.
In our simulations, passive shielding reduced by 25% the probability of a critical
incident. Given the significant impact of this passive (and largely free of cost) safety measure,
time should be spent on-mission schedule development to make the most use of possible
shielding. The effects of shielding, however, are a function of the actual particle flux in orbit
(which itself is uncertain), and of the position of the astronauts relative to any structure that
might shield them. In our model, we used a coarse estimate of the latter factor as we did not
have access to any conclusive data. Further refinement will be necessary.
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A major source of uncertainty is the flux of orbital debris. Current models provide some
estimates but they do not necessarily concur with experience. For example, the number of
window impacts on the shuttle assessed by simulation is 30% below the actual number
measured in orbit. Our simulation indicated that the probability of a critical event is very,
sensitive to both the probability of a particle hit and the size of the particle. An important input
is thus the flux distribution, i.e. the distribution of total flux measured by the size (diameter) of
the particles. In particular, everything else being equal, a change of 1% in the probability of a
particle hit (from 09782 to 0.9675) almost doubled the probability of a fatal accident _ The
same is true for variations of the particle diameter distribution. Uncertainties about the flux of
debris of less than 10cm diameter are of particular concern. Further, research indicates that all
sources or processes by which debris of this diameter class get generated are not well
understood (NRC, 1995). We do know that future space activity will increase the flux of
debris in LEO and other orbits. Therefore, we know that the amount of orbital debris will
increase, but their actual future flux can only be guessed. In addition, while current flux
models predict a very low probability of critical penetration of the EMU, data gathered from
space shuttle missions suggest that the current model predictions be reconsidered and that
further research into the flux of orbital debris is necessary.
In the long run, the total particle loads to which the astronauts will be subjected in orbit
depend on the duration of exposure as well as the debris flux. Unexpected events will most
likely increase the number of EVA hours. Reducing the risk of penetration due to particle hits
will require a harder space suit - or shielding. NASA has to decide if the development of such
an advanced space suit should be a priority item or if it could be delayed.
In our calculations, we performed a sensitivity analysis for the loads (debris flux)
because they appear to dominate the uncertainties of the results. We varied the probabilities of
impact and the probability distribution for the diameter of the orbital debris. We did not vary
the probability distribution for the meteorite diameter, as the research suggests that these data
are more reliable than the orbital debris data. The results of this sensitivity analysis are shown
in Appendix A, the parameters that we varied are listed in Appendix B.
For a full scale risk analysis, however, a sensitivity analysis of both the loads and the
capacities has to be performed since both are uncertain: the flux of orbital debris is uncertain
and the ballistic limits of various EMU elements have not been established by tests yet. Time
11We want to point out that due to the extremely low probabilities involved here, a Monte-Carlo simulation
reqmres a large number of runs. Therefore, these results have to be understood as more relative than absolute.
31
Pate-Cornetl and gachon
and budget constraints, however, did not allow us to perform a full-scale sensitivity analysis at
this point. Further research is also needed to assess the effects of impacts on soft and hard
suits, particularly on the combination of TMG covered aluminum sheets. In addition, the
contribution of these uncertainties about capacities to the uncertainties on the risk should be
assessed to permit proper interpretation of the results.
Other limitations of our results include the following:
1 Improved data on the relevance of oblique impacts are needed.
. We used a constant velocity of 10km/s for debris and 20km/s for meteorites. We are
aware that the velocity of particles varies and this variation can be represented by a
distribution, but we feel comfortable with our simplification after an analysis of the
velocity spectra.
. Better data are needed for PLss(F), the probability of failure for the life support system
given that there is a penetration in another part of the suit. This might prove to be an
important variable, since holes of diameter of less than 4mm are more likely that those
of larger diameters (we assume that a penetration hole of more than 4ram in diameter
results in a fatal accident)
4. Better data are needed for the probability of suit ignition due to particle penetration
.
We needed a better description of the mission profile of EVA missions. We needed to
know, in particular, the time spent in each environment to be able to estimate the
effects of passive shielding and we needed the distance to hatch over time to be able to
assess the time and oxygen necessary to get back to the hatch in the event of an
accident.
5.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR RISK MANAGEMENT
Although during E VAs, the astronauts are unlikely to be "as safe outside [the ISS] as
inside", the risks that were computed for the current ISS-related EVA plans seem to be
acceptable within the parameters defined by NASA. A number of uncertainties, however, can
affect the actual risk levels, including uncertainties about loads, capacities and exposure.
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In thefuturemanagementof suchEVAs, theseriskanalysisresultsarerelevantfor a numberof
decisionsstill to be made. First, passiveshieldingby the orbiter or the ISS shouldbe an
importantpart of EVA risk managementand taken advantageof wheneverpossible. The
numberof EVA hours is also an important componentof the risk. The 905 hours of
constructionshouldbe consideredfirm at this points but therewill undoubtedlybe some
furtherunexpectedEVAs requirements.
Thereremainsthe issueof whetherahardsuitshouldbemadeavailableandwhen. We
understandthat the time and budget constraintsof the ISS did not allow for the full
developmentof a hard suit at the time the final decisionwasmade. It seemshowever,that
additional work in LEO will be needed in the future, whether for the operation and
maintenance of the ISS or for other purposes (including perhaps, the repair of satellites).
Given the costs and the vuinerabilities of the current EMU, it would be logical to complete the
development of a hard suit with proper attention to mass and stowage volume. Such a robust
suit could be more easily produced and maintained than the current one, it could probably be
produced at lower costs, it could provide a higher level of safety, and it should be able to
sustain the higher pressures that are required for an improved level of human performance.
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APPENDIX A: RESULTS
PASSIVE SHIELDING
Probabifity of Hit I
Flux Disb'ibutJon:I
Outcomes: Frequencies: Probabilities:
AOK 29,995 99.983%
Penetration Soft Part 2 0.007%
Penetration Hard Part 3 0.010%
30,000 100.000%
Probability of Hit:.fl
Flux Dis_butJon: I
Outcomes: Frequencies: Probabilities:
AOK 29,991 99.970%
Penetration Soft Part 5 0.017%
Penetration Hard Part 4 0.013%
30,000 100.000%
Probability of Hit: I
Rux Dis_butJon: II
Outcomes: Frequencies: Probabilities:
AOK 29,992 99.973%
PenetrationSoft Part 5 0.017%
Penetration Hard Part 3 0.010%
30,000 100.000%
Probability of Hit II
Flux Dis_butJon: II
Outcomes: Frequencies: Probabilities:
AOK 29,992 99.973%
Penetration Soft Pad 4 0.013%
Penetration Hard Pad 4 0.013%
30,000 100.000%
NO PASSIVE SHIELDING
Probability of Hit I
Flux DisMbutJon: I
Outcomes: Frequencies: Probabilities:
AOK 29,994 99980%
Penetration Soft Part 5 0.017%
Penetration Hard Part 1 0003%
30,000 100.000%
Probability of Hit: II
Flux Distribution: I
Outcomes: Frequencies: Probabilities:
AOK 29,984 99.947%
Penetration Soft Part 13 0.043%
Penetration Hard Part 3 0.010%
30,000 100.000%
Probability of Hit: I
Flux Disb'ibution: II
Outcomes: Frequencies: Probabilities:
AOK 29,990 99.967%
Penetration Soft Part 9 0.030%
Penetration Hard Part 1 0.003%
30,000 100.000%
Probability of Hit: II
Rux OistJribut_on:II
Outcomes: Frequencies: Probabilities:
AOK 29,984 99.947%
PenetrationSoft Part 13 0.043%
PenetrationHard Part 3 0.010%
30,000 100.000%
Each table represents the results of a simulation run with a set of different parameters. The
parameters that were varied were the probability of being hit by a particle (scenarios [ and II)
and the diameter distribution of orbital debris, given that there is a hit by orbital debris
(scenarios I and [I). Appendix B shows probabilities for each of the parameters.
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• Probability of Hit (total flux consists of MM and OD)
[ Unmodified values: II Modified values:
P(No Hit) 0.9782 P(No Hit)
P(Hit) 0.0218 P(Hit)
Flux Distribution:
I Unmodified (taken from ORDEM96):
Orbital Debris
Diamater Percenta,(]e
[cm] of Flux
0.03 7.35E-01
0.04 1.71E-01
0.05 5.31E-02
0.06 2.04E-02
0.07 9.23E-03
0.08 4.58E-03
0.09 253E-03
0.10 1.49E-03
0.11 9.33E-04
0.12 6.15E-04
0.13 1.78E-03
II Modified:
Orbital Debris
Diamater Percentage
[cm] of Flux
0.03 6.00E-01
0.04! 1.00E-01
0.05 1.00E-01
0.06 1.00E-01
0.07 1.00E-01
0.08 1.00E-01
0.09 1.00E-01
0.10 1.00E-01
O.11 1.00E-01
0.12 1.00E-01
O.13 1.00E-01
Pate-Cornell and $achon
0.9675
0.0325
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APPENDIX C: PROGRAM CODE
REM THE FOLLOWING FUNCTION EVALUATES IF THERE IS PENETRATION OF THE EMU AND THE
REM DIAMETER OF THE HOLE IF A SOFT PART IS PENETRATED
REM PENETRATION IS SET TO i00 IN CASE OF FATAL ACCIDENT
REM
DATA FOR BALLISTIC LIMITS TAKEN FROM COUR-PALAIS, 1996
REM FORMULAE FOR MM AND OD HOLE DIAMETERS FROM COUR-PALAIS, 1996
REM
REM E IMPACT IMPACT ENERGY (TAKING DIAMETER AND IMPACT ANGLE
CONS IDERATI ON)
REM
FUNCTION PENETRATION(ANGLE, DIAMETER, HIT, PARTICLE, SUIT_PART, SHIELDING)
E IMPACT _- 0
INTO
IF PARTICLE -. 0 THEN
REM IMPACT BY ORBITAL DEBRIS
E IMPACT =- 0.5 * (4 / 3 * 3.14159265359 * (DIAMETER / 2) ^ 3 * 2.71) * 100000
• COS(ANGLE * 3.14159265359 / 180}
IF HIT =" 1 AND SHIELDING u 0 THEN
IF E IMPACT > 71 THEN
PENETRATION " I00: REM OD PENETRATES ANYTHING
ELSEIF E IMPACT >-- 60.4 AND SUIT PART -. 2 THEN
PENETRATION -. i00: REM OD PENETRATES PRIMARY GOX
ELSEIF E IMPACT >-- 44 AND SUIT PART " 1 THEN
PENETRATION ,. i00: REM OD PENETRATES HUT
ELSEIF SUIT PART ,, 0 THEN
PENETRATION ,, 0.00176 * (E_IMPACT ^ 1.35): REM OD PENETRATES SOFT PART,
HOLE DIAMETER
ELSE
PENETRATION ,- 0
END IF
ELSE
PENETRATION -, 0
END IF
ELSE
REM IMPACT BY MICRO-METEOROID
E IMPACT " 0.5 * (4 / 3 * 3.14159265359 * (DIAMETER / 2} ^ 3 * 1.15} * 400000
• COS(ANGLE * 3.14159265359 / 180}
IF HIT " 1 AND SHIELDING " 0 THEN
IF E IMPACT > 170 THEN
PENETRATION *" I00: REM M_ PENETRATES ANYTHING
ELSEIF E_IMPACT>-- 75 AND SUIT_PART " 2 THEN
PENETRATION " i00: REM _M PENETRATES PRIMARY GOX
ELSEIF E IMPACT >-- 70 AND SUIT PART " 1 THEN
PENETRATION *- i00: REM MM PENETRATES HUT
ELSEIF SUIT PART " 0 THEN
PENETRATION " 0.00153 * {E_IMPACT ^ 1.344): REM MM PENETRATES SOFT PART,
HOLE DIAMETER
ELSE
PENETRATION " 0
END IF
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ELSE
PENETRATION = 0
END IF
END IF
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END FUNCTION
REM - ,,
REM THE FOLLOWING EVALUATES HOW MUCH OXYGEN TIME THE ASTRONAUT HAS LEFT
FUNCTION TIME_R(LSS, SUIT, TIME_E, TIME_MIN, KSI)
REM TIME MEASURED IN HOURS TO BE CONSISTENT WITH PROBABILITIES
IF LSS ffi 1 AND SUIT a 0 THEN
TIME R = TIME MIN - TIME E
ELSEIF LSS - 1 AND SUIT < 0.4 THEN
REM LSS OK, SUIT HAS SMALL HOLE: PRIMARY AND SECONDARY GOX CAN BE USED
TIME_R _ 0.5 + (TIME_MIN - TIME_E) * KSI
ELSEIF LSS a 1 AND SUIT < i00 THEN
REM LSS OK, SUIT HAS LARGE HOLE: EXPONENTIAL LOSS OF OXYGEN
IF 0.5 * EXP(0.4 - SUIT) > 0 THEN
TIME R = 0.5 * EX_(0.4 - SUIT)
ELSE
REM HOLE TOO LARGE FOR OXYGEN PRESSURE TO RE STABLE
TIME R m 0
END IF
ELSEI¥ LSS < 1 AND SUIT = 0 THEN
REM LSS BAD, SUIT OK: LOSING OXYGEN, ABORT MISSION (I.E. NO ASTRONAUT DEAD
DUE TO BAD LSS)
TIME R - TIME MIN - TIME E
ELSEIF LSS < 1 AND SUIT < 0.4 THEN
REM LSS BAD, SUIT HAS SMALL HOLE: SWITCH TO SECONDARY GOX, BUT MIGHT NOT
WORK
TIME R - 0.5 * KSI
ELSE
REM LSS BAD AND SUIT HAS HOLE LARGE1% THAN 0.4 CM: FATAL
TIME R " 0
END IF
END FUNCTION
REM
REM TH_ FOLLOING FUNCTION EVELUATES THE STATE OF THE ASTRONAUT GIVEN PENETRATION
OCCURS
FUNCTION STATE(TIME, DISTANCE, HOLE, IGNITION)
IF HOLE > 0 THEN
IF IGNITION " 0 AND (TIME - DISTANCE)
STATE - 1
ELSE
STATE m 0
END IF
ELSE
STATE = 1
END IF
>0 THEN
4O
IF (TIME - DISTANCE) < 0 THEN STATE = 0
Pate-Corne{l and Sachon
END FUNCTION
REM
THE FOLLOWING FUNCTION EVALUATES IF A HARD OR A SOFT PART GOT PENETRATED
FUNCTION CAUSE(PART, EFFECT)
IF EFFECT = 0 THEN
IF PART > 0 THEN CAUSE = 2: REM HARD PART
IF PART _ 0 THEN CAUSE _ i: REM SOFT PART
ELSE
CAUSE = 0
END IF
END FUNCTION
REM
FUNCTION METEOROID FLUX(MASS)
REM METEOROID FLUX IN LEO AT 400KM
CO _ 3.156 * i0 ^ 7: Cl - 2200:C2 = 15:C3 - 1.3 * I0 ^ (-9)
C4 = i0 ^ ii: C5 -- i0 ^ 27:C6 -- 1.3 * i0 ^ (-16): C7 - i0 ^ 6
METEOROID FLUX = CO * ((Cl * MASS ^ 0.306 + C2) ^ (-4.38) + C3 * (MASS + C4 *
MASS ^ 2 + C5 * MASS ^ 4) ^ (-0.36) + C6 * (MASS + C7 * MASS ^ 2) ^ (-0.85))
METEOROID FLUX - 0.6680258 * 1.941843 * METEOROID FLUX: REM 0.66.. AND 1.94..
FOR CIRCULAR ORBIT AT 500KM
END FUNCTION
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ISource:Cour-Palais Report, Southwest Research Institute, June 1996 I
ITable 1: Shuttle Suit Element Surface Arias I
Sui_..t.t Material Failure
Elements Layup criteria
Boots TMG+B/adder NL & 4ram
Gloves TMG+B/Idder NL & 4ram
Lower Legs TMG+Bladder NL & 4ram
Upper Legs TMG+Bladder NL & 4ram
Lower Arms TMG+Bledder NL & 4ram
Upper Arms TMG+Bladder NL & 4ram
Waist Brief TMG+B/edder NL
Helmet&Visors Lexan+Po/y_. NPS
HUT TMG+Fiberg/. NPS
D&CM TMG+I.6mm A/u NPS
PLSS: Valves etc. TMG+ l Tmm Alu NPS
PLS$: CCC TMG+23mm A/u NL & 4ram
PLSS: Batt Cover TMG+O 48mm A/u NPS
PLSS: Primary Cox TMG+3.6mm A/u NPS
PLSS: Secondary Cox TMG+lSmmAlu NPS
Sizin_l Rin_ls TMG+32mm A/u NPS
S, Area Total Area Hard Are...aa
[m^21 [m^_l (m^2]
0.46 0,46
0.10 0.56
0.60 1.16
0,26 1.42
0.38 1.80
0.28 2.08
0.23 2.31
0.21 2.52 0.21
0.12 2.64 0.33
0.05 2.69 0.38
0.31 3.00 0.69
0.07 3.07 0.76
0.03 3.10 0.79
0.24 3.34 1.03
0.24 3.58 1.27
variable
0.0586592
0.0670391
Total surface area: 2.31 3.58
Total area soft parts: f.27 2.31 64.53%
Total area hard parts: 1.27 35.47%
ISource:Kosmo, Joseph J e-mail, Subiect: Status of EMU Material Sample Impact Tests, 24.02.1997
Vertical Impact
HITF Shoot M__ _ Volu_= M__tt Sold
[mm] [cm'3] [g] [km/s]
A 2905 AI 0.299 0.000112 0.000311 6.85
A2894 AI 0,300 0.000113 0.000314 700
A2898 AJ 0.392 0.00025; 0.000701 6.90
A2897 AI 0.404 0.000276 0.000768 6.68
A2900 AJ 0.500 0.000524 0.001456 7.03
A2907 AJ 0,600 0.000905 0002515 6.95
A2910 AJ 0.599 0.0(X)900 0002503 5.79
A2911 AJ 0.520 0.000589 0.001637 4.35
A2912 AJ 0.794 0.002097 0005829 5.23
A2929 AI 0.407 0.000282 0.000785 6.95
A2930 AJ 0.495 0.000508 0.001412 6.84
A2931 _J 0.608 0.000941 0.002617 7.18
A2932 AI 0.517 0000579 0.001609 5.68
A2933 _1 0.404 0.000276 0.000768 7.11
Specific Mm Al [g/cm^ 3]: 2.78
Kinetic Energy[J]: (Mils x VelocityA2)/2; [lVlassl=,kg,
ITable2: Space Shuttle Suit Balliltk: Limits
Suit Element Failure Mode Me_o_ Debts
BL[J1 BLrJI
Arms&Legs No Leak 3.4 3.2
Arms&Legs 4 mm Hole 68.0 68.0
Boots&Gloves No Leak 3.4 3.2
Boots&Gloves 4 mm Hole 68.0 M,0
Sizing Rings No Spall/t.eak _ 47.6 39.3
HUT No Spall_.uk 70.0 44.0
Waist(Brief) No Leak 3.4 3.2
Helmet&Visor No Spill/Leak 197.0 71.0
D&CM Not Critical NA NA
D&CM No Spill/Leak 11,5 10.0
PLSS: Primary COX No Spill/Leak 70.0 60.4
PLSS: Secondary COX No SpallA.eak 15.4 13.4
PLSS: CCC No Spill/Leak 25,5 21,4
PLSS: CCC 4 rnm Hole 172.0 71.0
PLSS Battery Cover No SpallA.eak 3,5 3.5
PLSS: Valves etc. Not Critical NA NA
PLSS: Valves etc. No S pall/Lsak 11.5 10.0
Eo_ecaX aaN.t
[J] [d_d
5.25 0
5.54' 0
12.01 0
12.32 0
25.68 01
43.70 0_
30.18 0!
11.14 0
57.35 0
13.64 30
23.77 30
48.53 30
18.64 30
1396 45
[Velocity] = r_s
[J] [Bladder]
5.25 No Hole
5.54 No Hole
12.01 No Hole
12.32 No Hole
25.88 No Hole
43.70! Pinhole
30.18! Hole (1.3ram)
11,14 No Hole
57.35 Hole (2.Sx2.1mm)
11.81 No Hole
20.68 Pinhole
4203 Hole (0.5mm)
16.06 Hole (0,8mm)
9B7 No Hole
Simulation Input.xts
Assumption: Diameter
Custom distribution with parameters:
Total Relative Probability
Assumpdon: Particle Hit
Custom distribution with parameters:
Total Relative Probability
[Final Model.xls]Model - Cell: E23
Relative Prob.
0.030 O.734615
0.040 O. 170769
0.050 0.053077
0,060 0.020385
0.070 0.009231
0.080 0.004577
0.090 0.002529
0. I O0 0.001490
0.110 0.000933
O. 120 0.000615
O. 130 0.00 ! 779
I .OOOOOO
[Final Modal.xls]Model - Cell: B23
0.00 0.982420
1.00 0.017580
1.0OOOOO
Assumpdon: LSS Perf. [Final Model.xls]Model - Cell: K32
Custom distribution with parameters:
Singlepoint
Single point
Total Relative Probability
0.OO 0.0010OO
1.00 0.999000
1.0OOOOO
Assumption: Ksi [Final Modal.xls]Model - Cell:
(random variable usedto simulateoxygen left in primary GOX after penetration)
Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 0.00
Maximum 1.00
Assumption: Ignidem
G32
Custom distribudon with parameters:
Single point 0.OO
Single point 1.OO
Total Relative Probability
[Final Modal.xls]Model - Cell: H38
0.999000
0.OO10OO
1.0OOOOO
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Simulation Inpur..xls
Assumption: Part of Suit
Custom distribution with parameters:
Single point
Single point
Single point
Single point
Total Relative Probability
Assumption: Shielding
Custom distribution with parameters:
Single point
Single point
Total Relative Probability
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
0.O0
1.O0
[Final Modd.xls]Model - Ceil: 1(23
Relative Prob.
0.640000
0.230000
0.070000
0.060000
1.0OOOOO
[Find Model.xls]Model - Cell: B29
Relative Prob.
0.504167
0.495833
1.OOOOOO
Assumption: Particle
Custom distribution with parameters:
Single point
Single point
Total Relative Probability
1.00
2.00
[Find Model.xls]Model - Cell: B34
Reladve Prob.
0.635393
0.364607
1.0OOOOO
Assumpdon: H21mpact Angle
(the output was multiplied by 90)
Beta distribution with parameters:
Alpha 1.OO
Beta 4.00
Scale 1.0OO
Selected range is from 0.000 to +Infinity
[Find Model.xls]Mockd - Cell: H24
Assumption: MM Diameter
Custom distribution with parameters:
Total Relative Probability
0.030
0.040
0.050
0.060
0.070
0.080
0.090
0.100
0.110
0.120
[Find Modd.xls]Model - Ceil: E40
0.626761
0.203658
0.081764
0.037889
O.019481
0.010839
0.006416
0.003994
0.002590
0.006607
1.OOOOOO
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